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Terrorism and the Media: Patterns of Occurrence and Presentation,
1969-1980
Abstract
"What we have to do is tell people about what's going on in the world." This quote from Ted Koppel, an ABC
anchorman, taken from a recent TV commercial for the network news, captures the key focus of this paper. To
what extent does television news accurately inform its viewers about what is going on in the world? We begin
to answer this question by focusing on one topic which is both of political significance and has received a large
amount of coverage from the networks: International terrorism. (I) By comparing the amount and type of
coverage which international terrorism received from the networks over the period 1969 to 1980 to a more
systematic set of data based upon world-wide reports of international terrorism over the same period, we can
test the degree to which viewers are provided with an accurate picture of what international terrorism is,
where it is happening, against whom, and how often. In addition, we look more closely at network treatment
of a single terrorist incident to speak to the more subtle ideological aspects of media coverage.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In the next two sections we examine television news in general
terms, discussing its strengths and weaknesses as a provider of information, considering previous theoretical
and empirical work on the topic, and laying out our expectations. In the fourth section we give the details of
our specific analysis, discussing the choice of international terrorism, operationalizing concepts, describing
the data sets, and explaining the methods. Section five is a presentation of results with a brief discussion.
Section six is a more detailed case study of coverage of the seizure of the Dominican Republic Embassy in
Colombia in 1980. The final section consists of a summary, discussion and some concluding remarks
concerning network coverage of international terrorism, and the larger questions of television as a source of
political information and political agendas.
Comments
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2008), he is a faculty member of the Annenberg School for Communication at the University of Pennsylvania.
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TERRORISM AND THE MEDIA: PATTERNS OF OCCURRENCE AND PRESENTATION,
1969-1980*, by Michael X. Delli Carpini and Bruce A. Williams [11]
I. Introduction
"What we have to do is tell people about what's going on in the
world." This quote from Ted Koppel, an ABC anchorman, taken from a
recent TV commercial for the network news, captures the key focus of
this paper. To what extent does television news accurately inform
its viewers about what is going on in the world? We begin to answer
this question by focusing on one topic which is both of political
significance and has received a large amount of coverage from the
networks: International terrorism. (I) By comparing the amount and
type of coverage which international terrorism received from the
net'N'orks over the period 1969 to 1980 to a more systematic set of
data based upon world-wide reports of international terrorism over
the same period, we can test the degree to which viewers are provided
with an accurate picture of what international terrorism is, where it
is happening, against whom, and how often. In addition, we look more
c1o~3ely at network treatment of a single terrorist incident to speak
to the more subtle ideological aspects of media coverage.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In the next two
sec-tions we examine television news in general terms, discussing its
strengths and weaknesses as a provider of information, considering
previous theoretical and empirical work on the topic, and laying out
our expectations. In the fourth section we give the details of our
specific analysis, discussing the choice of international terrorism,
opel:ationalizing concepts, describing the data sets, and explaining
the methods. section five is a presentation of results with a brief
discussion. Section six is a more detailed case study of coverage
of the seizure of the Dominican Republic Embassy in Colombia in 1980.
The final section consists of a summary, discussion and some conclud-
ing remarks concerning network coverage of international terrorism,
and the larger questions of television as a source of political in-
formati on and political agendas.
That television is an important provider of information is ob-
vious. It is the major source of news for the u.S. population today,
with more people citing it as such than any other medium. In addi-
tion. younger people are even more likely to depend on TV over news-
pap(~rs and magazines, and give indications of remain~ng so as they
grO\<l to adulthood (Jennings and Niemi, 1981). Systemic indicators of
change point in a similar direction. The number of newspapers in op-
eration (or remaining independent) has been declining steadily in re-
cent: years, while the number of TV stations broadcasting (from under
50 1:0 over 700) and TV sets in use (from under 5% to almost 100% of
U.S .. homes) has risen dramatically in the past three decades (The
Media Book, 1978). And of course the expected cable explosion will
increase the movement to television as a source of information.
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What is the impact of this move to an electronic mass media
society? The answer to this question hinges on the answer to two
more focused ones: vlliat is the nature of the information provided
by television? And, what is the nature of the influence of that
information on the population? Much of the political science liter-
ature on the media and politics has focused on the latter question,
employing survey research of one form or another to tap the impact
of media use on political attitudes, information and behavior. The
results of this kind of analysis suggest a modest relationship be-
tween media use and political involvement, 'with the relationship less
strong for TV use than newspaper use (Patterson, 1980). Such analy-
sis suffers from being unable to adequately distinguish media users
from non-users, as the investigators themselves readily admit. In a
society in which virtually everyone has a television and in which "on
an average day, 80 percent of all Americans are reached by television
and newspapers (and) on a typical evening the television audience is
close to 100 million people, nearly half the entire population"
(Graber, 1980) it is difficult to identify people who are truly un-
influenced by the media. Awareness of this situation has led theor-
ists to consider the more subtle effects of the electronic media,
such as passive learning:
This form of learning may be said to be largely passive in that
neither motivation nor interest is a prerequisite for the at-
tainment of knowledge. Information and knowledge, in other
words, are "caught rather than taught" (Krugman and Hartley,
1971). ThUS, passive learning is effortless and, although the
knowledge gained may in fact be used when triggered by later
events or situations, it is unrelated to immediate needs or
situations. Many people may find themselves holding and impart-
ing information which they did not consciously seek to acquire,
and later acting on the basis of this information (Zukin and
Snyder, 1982).
This kind of passive learning has been demonstrated in several
different settings, including the watching of networks news (Wamsley
and Pride, 1972). This line of research suggests that a main role of
the electronic media may well be its agenda-setting function (Graber,
1978, 1980; Shaw and McCombs, 1977): "When the media make events
seem important, politicians are likely to comment about them and to
take action. This enhances widespread belief in the importance of
these events and assures even more public attention" (Graber, 1980).
Given this importance in agenda-setting for the media, the
question raised earlier concerning the accuracy and quality of the
information broadcast takes on added significance. If the viewer is
in part determining her sense of what is important in the political
world from a partially unconscious process of media exposure, then
what is being transmitted is critical. Our knowledge in this area
is somewhat less developed. Much has been written, for instance,
concerning the organizational, economic, personal, and technological
constraints in the production of network news, and about how these
constraints should, theoretically lead to certain distortions in the
selection of stories to present and ways to present them (Epstein,
1974; Crouse, 1972; Gans, 1979; Sigal, 1973). These analyses are
supported with specific examples, limited case studies, and personal
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reflections which are valuable contributions, but lack a certain
generalizability. The more systematic content analyses that are done
can demonstrate what is shown on television, but can only speculate
as to the appropriateness of the choice and mix of subjects (Patter-
son, 1980; Gerbner and Gross, 1976; Dominick, 1977).
What is needed is not only a careful analysis of what is pre-
sented on the evening news, but also a baseline or standard against
which to measure that presentation. Funkhauser does this in an anal-
ysis of media coverage of issues in the 1960's (1973). In this anal-
ysis he compares the number of stories on Vietnam, crime, and urban
riots to more objective measure of their significance. For example
he compares the number of articles on crime in Time, Newsweek, and
U.s. News and World Report to the number of crimes-reported 10 the
U.s. per 100,000 people throughout the decade of the 1960's. He finds
that for all three issues studied, the coverage peaked before the
events themselves, leading to a sense of lessened importance at the
same time that the issues were equally or more prevalent. What we are
proposing is a similar analysis focusing on a different issue and a
different medium.
III. Network News and International Terrorism
Previous analyses of network news broadcasts suggest that cer-
tain biases in coverage exist. The search for mass appeal and the
visual nature of the medium leads to a preoccupation with the drama-
tic, the conflictual and the violent (Gerbner et al., 1978). Given
this fact, international political terrorism would be expected to
receive a fair amount of network coverage. Our content analysis,
to be described in detail later, bears this out: Over the period from
1969 to 1980 not one month passed in which the networks did not de-
vote at least one story to the topic. In addition, international
terrorism is a topic of some considerable political importance. It
is defined here as the use or threat of violence for political pur-
poses, designed to disrupt or intimidate a larger sphere than the
immediate victims, and involving actions and/or individuals that
cross national boundaries. As such it is an important indicator of
political, social and economic dissatisfaction and instability. In
addition, as we shall see, it is a growing phenomenon in the inter-
national system. It is, therefore, a good choice for our test of
the accuracy of network news generally, as well as an important topic
in and of itself.
An expectation of extensive coverage does not mean an expecta-
tion of accurate coverage. Indeed, the literature on network news
suggests the existence of biases that make it extremely difficult
for the networks to accurately cover either the extent of or the
motivations for political terrorism. Interviews with -and surveys of
both viewers and editors suggest a bias away from foreign news in
favor of national stories in the U.s. (Epstein, 1974, Weaver and
Mauro, 1978; Rubin, 1979). In addition, that foreign news which is
covered tends to emphasize u.s. involvement (Gans, 1979) and/or
extremely violent events (Diamond, 1975). further, news coverage is
filtered through values and news gathering procedures that tend to
accept and support the existing social order (Gans, 1979). Other
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constraints of costs, technology, ~anpower and language skills lead to
biases away from peripheral areas, both nationally and internationally
(Lent, 1977; Bogart, 19f18; Graber, lq91J).. Applying this specifically
to the issue at hand, we would, therefore, expect an exaggeration of
the amount of terrorism involvin~ u.s. citizens, an exaggeration of
the amount of terrorisM cross inn into the U.S., and an exaqgeration
of the types of terrorism which are most dramatic, unusual or Violent.
Terrorism involving less central (from the u.S. point of view) nations
and issues, that occurs in less accesihle areas, or that is more rou-
tine are expected to get less coveraqe. In addition, we expect cover-
age to downplay the dissatisfaction with the social order or political
ideology of terrorists.
The overriding expectation centers on the networks central motive
or purpose to the extent that the industry sees its role as one of, as
mentioned above, "telling people what is going on in the world," the!:
the coverage of international terrorism should approach an accurate
reflection of the political reality. To the extent, however, that
concerns for audience appeal, consistent themes and economic gain dom-
inate, concerns for accuracy become secondary. Our own bias, given a
reading of the literature and being members of the viewing audience 0:
network news, leads us to expect the latter.
IV. Data and Methods
The analysis to follow involves three separate data sets. The
first is a content analysis of network news broadcasts. The data was
collected by examining the Television News Index and Abstracts pub-
lished monthly by Vanderbilt University. The abstracts conta~n lim-
ited information, and do not provide direct quotes, but do have sev-
eral key bits of information that we were able to utilize. Specifi-
cally, we were able to determine if a story dealt with the topic of
international terrorism, where the event took place, what type of an
event it was (kidnapping, hostages, etc.), the nationality of the
victims, the type of citizen involvea-Tmilitary, diplomat, private
citizen, etc.), the nationality of the terrorist, and the length of
each indiv~dual story in seconds. This information was gathered for
all weekday network news broadcasts for all three national networks
(ABC, CBS, and NBC) from January, 1969 to December, 1980.
The method of data collection involved going through the detail-
ed index for each month and recording the location of any broadcast
that possibly contained a reference to an international terrorist
event. The abstracts for these broadcasts were then examined, and
those that did not meet our definition of international terrorism
were discarded. The information described above was then recorded ~
for the remaining broadcast seaments. Several checks on this approac ..
were also included. First, fo~ three years of broadcasting, the da~~
was collected both by the method described above and by a page exaffi1 -
nation of the entire yearly abstract. The two approaches were then
compared to see if there was any loss of information by using the
first method. Second, for the two different year, the data was col-~
lected by two separate investigators, and the results compared. Bot.·
of these checks suggested that the main method of data collection wa~
successfully capturing all of the relevant information.
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Our baseline, or measure of actual terrorist occurrences is pro-
vided by the research of Edward F. Mickolus. The data set, known as
ITERATE (International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events) ,
is a content analysis of world-wide information sources and is designed
to provide, among other things, a systematic picture of trends in in-
ternational terrorism (a review of the specific sources used in the
data collection is provided by Mickolus,-1977). (2) While ITERATE is
limit~ed to reported acts of terrorism and is, therefore, not a perfect
reflection of real world events, it is generally regarded to be one of
the few methodologically rigorous attempts to catalogue terrorist oc-
currences over time (Mitchell and Kelly, 1981) and is used or cited
throughout the academic literature on this subject (Alexander and
Finger, 1977; JI'lilbanl'\., 1976; Bassiouni, 1981; Mitchell and Kelly,
1981). In short, it provides as accurate a view of the actual pat-
term:; of international terrorism as is available today. (3)
The final data to be used are the actual video tapes of all the
broadcasts involving the takeover and holding of the Dominican Repub-
lic Embassy in Columbia. The abstracts allow us to examine the gen-
eral trends in presentation but, in order to get a more complete grasp
of the subtler aspects of the coverage, we include this detailed case
study based upon the video broadcasts themselves. In addition, exam-
ining the actual broadcasts provide a third check on the accuracy of
the abstracts we use for the trend analyses.
The units of measurement compared in the analysis are number of
minutes (and seconds) of coverage by the networks, and number of
terrorist acts documented in the events data. We chose number of
minutes rather than number of events because, given our emphasis on
passive learning and agenda settinq, and given television's basic
visual impact, the key variable is clearly exposure time. To equate
a 10 second announcement to a 3 minutes story would be to miss the
way in which television affects its viewers.
In actually comparing the network coverage to our baseline of
terrorism's incidence, we focused on three major types of comparisons.
First, within each year, we were interested in how accurately televi-
sion divided its time among the types of terrorist acts, their loca-
tions, etc. Second, across years we were interested in how accu-
rately the networks adjusted the amount and emphasis of their cover-
age to match the changing occurrence of international terrorism in
the world. Finally, we were interested in reconstructing the con-
clusions a viewer of the network news would draw about trends in in-
ternational terrorism, and how these conClusions compare to a more
"objective" catalogue of events. In all cases \.,e also compare the
three networks to each other to see if one is a more sensitive trans-
mitter of the political world, or if the constraints of time, money,
technology and information sources lead to similar patterns of
coverage.
v. Findings
Table I (See the attached) presents the basic natterns of occur-
rence and coverage over the twelve year period under examination. It
is immediately obvious that, first, <3.11 threl2! net~,rr)rks are extremely
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similar in their patterns of coverage and, second, none of them very
closely parallels the pattern of actual occurrence of international
terrorism. For example, from 1969 to 1970 the amount of terrorism in-
creased by over 80%, while coverage remained virtually the same for
all three networks. Conversely, between 1970 and 1971, terrorism
dropped only slightly (about 17%) while coverage dropped an average of
78%. This type of relationship can be found throughout the twelve
year period examined. In fact, in five of the 11 "jumps" from one
year to the next, the amount of coverage moves in the opposite direc-
tion from the'movement in the amount of terrorism reported. In 1978,
by far the year with the most international terrorist events, the cov-
erage on ABC and NBC ranked 8th lowest out of the 12 years, and CBS
coverage was its 10th lowest.
Another way to get a sense of the erratic nature of the coverage
is by comparing the ratio of minutes covered to number of events over
the period examined. While we can not say what a proper amount of
coverage is, we would expect that consistent coverage would mean a
relatively consistent ratio. The greater the variability in the
ratio, the greater the distortion in coverage, with high ratios exag-
gerating the amount of terrorism and low ratios playing it down. I'le
present these ratios in Table 2 (see the attached), along with the
average ratio for the twelve ye~rs. Once again, the similarity in
coverage across the three networks is striking, and once again the in-
consistency in coverage also stands out.
The ratios vary from a low of .15 for CBS in 1969 to a high of
1.37 on ABC in 1980. This indicates coverage with very little connec-
tion to real world occurrences. In 1969, 1979, and 1980, the amount
of coverage on all three networks greatly exaggerated the amount of
terrorism relative to coverage in other years. similarly, in 1978
or 1974, the amount of coverage downplayed the amount of terrorism.
And these misrepresentations seem to have little to do with the abso-
lute amount of terrorism.
The total amount of coverage is only one consideration in eval-
uating television coverage of international terrorism. What about
the substance of that coverage? Do the networks divide their time
up in ways that result in a realistic view within each year? We
attempted to gauge this by examining terrorism's location as re-
ported by the networks and comparing it to the event's actual loca-
tions. Table 3,(see the attachedl~epresents information relating to
thisouestion. The numbers are the percentage of the coverage de- _
voted·to each of the geographic areas listed, minus the percentage o~
terrorism which the events data shows actually occurred in that area
for that year. The numbers, therefore, are a measure of wi~hin-y~ar
distortion by the networks: The closer to 0, the less the d~stort~on.
A large positive number means "too much" air time to that area, whi~e
a large negative number means "not enough" air time. For example, J.r
1969 NBC devoted 37% more of its coverage of international terroris IT
to terrorism in North America than it should have.
An examination of Table 3 uncovers several important character-
istics of network coverage of terrorism. First, as we found with
overall coverage, there is a tremendous similarity among the networkS
in terms of what areas of the world they focus on. Second,. as we
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expected, North America is often over-represented in the coverage, by
as much as 57% (NBC in ~970). Third, the most distorted areas are
the Middle East, where terrorism is exaggerated by an average of 25%,
and Latin America, where it is downplayed by about 17%. A fourth
point of interest concerns the volatility of the coverage. Distor-
tions in coverage are all the more disturbing because they can occur
suddenly, after years of much different coverage. A viewer of the
network news would have an image of 1969 and 1975 as years of terror-
ist activity in Asia that would be exaggerated, while 1972 would ap-
pear undUly peaceful in the Far East. The ~1iddle East is always Qver-
covered, but even here certain years stand out as gross exaggerations
(1970, 1974, 1979, and 1980). Western Europe was over-covered in the
early 70's, but has been under-covered since 1974. The only areas
which show very little distortion are those where very little inter-
naticnal terrorism occurs: USSR/Eastern Europe, Africa, and the Paci-
fic. All together these three areas account for only 5% of all the
international terrorism which was reported in the period under exami-
nation.
Similar kinds of distortion are evident when we examine types
of terrorist incidents. Table 4 (see the attached),presents data on
the main forms of terrorism. These seven types of acts account for
over 80% of all the international terrorism which occurred over the
period studies. Once again we see that similarities among the net-
works and distortions in coverage of certain types of incidents is
the norm. Bombings, which are by far the most prevalent form of
terrorist act (46% of all terrorism) are grossly deemphasized, on
the network news. Political threats are also downplayed, despite
occurring quite frequently every year. Conversely, hostage seizures
and hijackings are given far more coverage than their actual occur-
rence warrants. The massive coverage which the Iranian hostage crisis
received is an extreme example of magnification of an event, but is
not by any means unique. Coverage of armed attacks shows a more er-
ratic pattern, with periods of relatively appropriate coverage fol-
10v-led by sudden increases in the relatlve attention paid to this
type of event.
The final pattern of general international terrorism to be ex-
amined concerns incidents involving U.s. targets or victims. Table
5, (::.'ee the attached), presents evidence of over- and under-coverage
of international terrorism against U.S. citizens as compared to ter-
rori",;m against other nationals. Surprising'ly, terrorism against u. s.
citizens is not systematically over-covered as we expected for the
reasons explained earlier. Instead, relative coverage of terrorism
against U.S. citizens follows the general pattern we found for the
other elements exa~ined. Coverage is very volatile, with years of
great: relative under-coverage (an average of 50% less the coverage
in 1971 devoted to U.s. targets than expected), and equally great
over-·coverage (1979 and 1980). It is interestinq to note that, just
prior to the explosion in relative coverage in 1979 and 1980, there
was a year of relatively low coverag~. The combination of these two
distortions may have added to a sense of victimization on the part
of the U.S. in this period. We will consider this in more detail
at a later point.
While the relative coverage of terrorism against U.S. citizens
was neither more accurate nor more consistently exaggerated than
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overall terrorism, it is possible that when coverage of this phenome-
non is considered by itself it demonstrates more consistent. pat-
terns. That is, perhaps the failure of the networks to accurately
portray overall international terrorism is a function of a perceived
lack of importance or centrality to the viewing audience. Terrorism
involving u.s. citizens, on the other hand, may be central enough to
be more closely monitored and, therefore, more accurately portrayed.
Tables 6 and 7 I (Bee the attached), replicate the information pre-
sented in Tables land 2, except this time only for terrorism involv-
ing u.s. targets. From Table 6 it is clear that the pattern of cover-
age of terrorism involving u.s. citizens does not differ much from
that of overall terrorism. Nor does it any more accurately reflect
real world changes in terrorism. In six of the eleven shifts from one
year to the next, coverage of terrorism moves in the opposite direc-
tion as the amount of terrorism. For example, while the amount of
terrorism against u.s. targets was doubling between 1977 and 1978,
the amount of coverage was cut to a ninth of its 1977 total. In fact,
1978 received by far the smallest amount of coverage for the entire
period, even though it was the year with the most terrorism aimed at
u.s. citizens and U.S. facilities. Even in years where increases or
decreases in coverage paralleled increases or decreases in events,
the ratio of change was often as misleading as change in the wrong
direction. For example, between 1970 and 1971 acts against u.s.
targets decreased by 7% while coverage decreased 87 to 89%.
When we turn to the ratio of minutes of coverage to number of
events, we find even more fluctuation than in the case of overall
terrorism. A terrorist incident in 1978 averaged .02 minutes of
coverage, while 1969 averaged over a minute, 1979 over two minutes
and 1980 over 3. As usual, all three networks show similar patterns
of coverage. The average coverage per event is higher in the case
of terrorism against u.S. citizens than it is for overall terrorism,
however.
Our data do not allow us to examine where terrorism specifi-
cally against u.s. citizens occurs on a year by year basis, but we
can look at types of acts against u.s. citizens alone. Table 8 (see
the attached), presents this information. As can be seen, the rtet-
works are not more accurate at capturing a realistic view of terror-
ism against U.S. citizens than they are at showing overall terrorist
acts. As with overall terrorism, bombings are greatly under-covered,
as to a lesser extent, are threats. Although hijackings are consis-.
tently over-covered, coverage of kidnapings, hostage seizures, assas1 -
nations, and armed attacks is more volatile. The extremes in cover-
age, however, seem to be more pronounced in attacks on u.s. citizens
than in the overall case. Althou~h bombinqs are under-covered by
30 to 55 percent in the overall- c;se (Table- 4), under-coverage of 60
to 70 percent is not uncommon in the U.S. coverage. Conversely,
over-coverage of hijacking is more extreme in the case of U.S. tar-
gets. Generally, however, the patterns are quite parallel.
For the first time we also see a few areas in which the networkS
differ sizably in coverage patterns. In 1978 CBS devoted much more
"oiits air time to assassinations and assassination attempts against
U.S. targets than did the other networks. A similar pattern occurs
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in the coverage of armed attacks in 1978. The coverage of terrorism
in 1978 was quite small, however, permitting the percentages to vary
a great deal with only small differences in coverage. The data on
u.s. victims also allow us to examine variability in coverage that is
related to the type of U.S. citizen victimized by terrorist attacks.
Table 9 (see the attached),presents information on under- and over-
~rag~ of terrorism against U.S. government officials, military
personnel, business executives, and private citizens. As can be seen,
the networks fare no better in this breakdown than they do in the
others. Attacks on government officials were greatly underplayed in
1970.' 1971, and 1972 and grossly exaggerated in 1974, 1979, and 1980.
Attacks on the military were under-covered in 1976 through 1980, but
over··covered in 1969, 1971, and 1975. Attacks against u.s. business
executives, the most cornman target of international terrorism over
the -twelve year span, were, with the exception of 1978, consistently
down·-played. And terrorism against U. S. pJ:-ivate citizens, the least
common occurrence against u.s. targets, is magnified in seven of the
twelve years studies. The type of u.s. citizens attacked, like all
of the other categories examined, is badly misrepresented by the
network news.
The final issue to be examined concerns the overall images of
international terrorism that are left by t,,,elve years of network
coverage. What pictures of this phenomenon are developed after years
of TV news viewing? Tables 10 and 11 (Bee the attached),show the
patt'2rns of over- and under-coverage for overall international ter-
rorism. Terrorism in the USSR, Africa, Asia and the Pacific is fair-
ly well represented, but these four areas combined only account for
12 percent of the total amount of terrorism that occurred. Terror-
ism in North America, which is about 10 percent of worldwide terror-
ism, is also quite adequately covered. Distorted coverage is most
prevalent where terrorism is most prevalent. Terrorism in Latin
America and Western Europe is downplayed by 11 and 17 percent re-
spectively, while terrorism in the Middle East is greatly exagger-
ated. Because 75 percent of all international terrorism occurs in
these areas, such inaccuracies have a particularly significant effect
on the viewing public's knowledge of terrorist activity.
The greatest distortions in types of terrorist incidents occur
with the under-coverage of bombings and threats and the over-cover-
age of hostages seizures and hijackings. The same general pattern
holds true when only attacks against u.s. targets are considered
(Table 12).
Finally, when the twelve year coverage of types of u.s. victims
is examined, a pattern of exaggerating government victimization and
dismissing terror against business is apparent. In all the twe1ve-
year combined comparisons, the similarity among networks is dramatic.
VI. The seizure of the Dominican Embassy in Colombia: A Case Study
Our examination of overall trends in network coverage of poli-
tical terrorism does not get at the ways in which specific events
are portrayed. It cannot, therefore, ans~'er important questions
such as: How are terrorist acts explained? What aspects of a ter-
rorist act are deemed newsworthy? How are the terrorists themselves
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portrayed? Acts of political terrorism pose two difficult problems
for journalists. First, they are faced with difficult choices when
deciding how much coverage to give to a particular event. On the one
hand, there is always the chance (or the chance that someone will make
the accusation) that prominent coverage will encourage further acts
of violence. On the other hand, ignoring such events may encourage
even more violent acts that cannot possibly be ignored (Gans, 1979).
Second, there is a problem regarding the content of the coverage that
is given to terrorist acts. On the one hand, journalists do not want
to glorify political terrorists and in this way encourage other ter-
rorists. On the other hand, in countries lacking political freedom
but abounding in substantial grievances, political terrorism is a
highly effective means for bringing attention to such complaints. In
order to address these issues, we now turn to a detailed examination
of coverage of a single act of political terrorism: The sixty day
seizure of the Dominican Republic's Embassy in Bogota, Colombia.
In our analysis of this event, we compare the amount and content
of its coverage by the three network evening news programs with its
coverage by the New York Times. We choose the Times as a baseline
for comparison not because we believe in its "objectivity," but be-
cause network journalists themselves use it as a standard setter:
The Times is treated as the professional setter of standards,
just-as-Harvard University is perceived as the standard setter
of university perfonnance. When editors and producers are
uncertain about a selection decision, they will check whether,
where, and how the Times has covered the story~ and story
selectors see to it that many of the Time's front-page stories
find their way into television progra.ID'S""":" •• (Gans,1979:180)
In our analysis, then, we will compare the networks and the Times in
the amount of coverage and, more importantly, the content of the
coverage given to the embassy seizure. More generally, we are in-
terested in determining the view one would have of the embassy
seizure if one relied solely on the broadcasts of the networks as
opposed to relying solely on the Times.
On February 27, 1980, a group of armed individuals shot their
way into the Dominican Embassy in Bogota. The takeover of the em-
bassy occurred during a party celebrating the Dominican Republic's
independence and, consequently, nineteen ambasSadors were among the
53 hostages taken. The instruders identified themselves as members
of M19, an anti-government guerrilla force that had been operating
in Colombia since 1974. The seizure of the embassy was to last
until April 27, when the members of the M19 freed their remaining
hostages and flew to Cuba where they were granted asylum. These are
the basic facts about the particular terrorist incident we will be
examining. As we demonstrate, there were vast differences in the
manner in which the Times and the networks chose to cover the event.
The Extent of Coverage
Columns one, two and three of Table l4,(see the attached),surn-
marize the amount of coverage given by the Times and the three net-
works to the Colombian event. All three networks devoted a similar
112
number of broadcasts to the event. However, while ABC and CBS reported
on the situation in the first minute of their broadcasts on four occa-
sions, NBC led with the embassy seizure only once. The Times ran
stories on the crisis for 52 of its 61 days and on nine days, these
stories made the first page. Obviously, due to the differences in
medium it is difficult to draw any conclusions about the relative
differences in extent of coverage between the networks and the Times.
In addition to periodic features on various aspects of the em-
bassy seizure, both the networks and the Times ran short news stories
concentrating on daily significant developments in the crisis. While
the form and balance between news and features was similar between
the Times and the networkS, the content of these stories was quite
different in the two media.
The Content of Coverage
While the great bulk of both network and newspaper coverage of
the hostage situation dealt with detailing day-to-day events (e.g.,
meetings between government and guerrilla representatives, release
and escape of hostages, they spent varying amounts of time on other
subjects related to the crisis). In this section we examine coverage
of four SUbjects: Colombian government and society; the guerrilla
group M19; the demands made by M19, negotiations and resolution of
the crisis; Diego Asencio, the U.S. Ambassador to colombia and one
of the hostages at the Dominican embassy. Three of these four sub-
jects are critical for developing an understanding of the embassy
seizure; one, while not critical to understanding the seizure, serves
to highlight differences between network and Times coverage of the
event. -----
Colombian Government and Society--tn both news and feature
stories, and especially at the beginning of the crisis, the Times
spent a good deal of its coverage on social and political problems
in Colombia. On March 2, for example, a Times article discussed the
long history of political violence in the-country; the growing power
of the military in the country; accusations of human rights groups
that the government tortured political prisoners; the fact that,
despite having the oldest Constitution in Latin America, Colombia
has been ruled under a state of seige for 17 of the past 20 years"
(New York Times, March 2, 1980). Indeed, this article reported that
many believed that the Minister of Defense, an army general, was
actually running the country. On March 5, an article discussed the
upcoming Congressional by-elections and noted the hostage crisis as
an excuse for suppressing their electoral activities (New York Times,
March 5, 1980).
On April 17, the newspaper reported that Amnesty International
had "unequivocally concluded" that "political prisoners were systema-
tically tortured by Colombian military personnel" (New York Times,
April 17, 1980). In short, Colombia was portrayed by the Times as
an extremely troubled country with a f at best, tentative and falter-
ing democratic system.
Network coverage of Colombian government and society was, to
say the least, considerably different from the Times. Indeed, none
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of the networks dealt with these subjects at any length. As column
four of Table 14 indicates, no network spent even as much as a minute
on this subJect over the entire 61 days of the crisis. Further, 'with
one exception, this limited time was devoted to simply noting that
Colombian elections were taking place and negotiations were suspended
for that day. CBS reported on March 5, for example, that the Colom-
bian President hoped for a large turn-out and an impressive victory
for his party as a demonstration of popular support for his handling
of the hostage situation. No mention was even made in later broad-
casts of whether the government hopes were realized. No mention was
ever made of the power of the military, human rights violations, past
violence in the country, or any of the subjects that the Times dealt
with at length. Indeed, the only hint a viewer received that Colom-
bia was anything less than a well-functioning American-style elec-
toral democracy was a brief note on ABC on April 27: It referred to
the fears of some "liberals and leftists" that the government would
use the hostage crisis, now resolved, as an excuse for an extensive
crack-down.
Ironically, the only recognition of social problems in Colombia
came in NBC'S coverage of the resolution of the hostage crisis.
Here, the network aired the statement of a U.S. State Department
spokesperson reporting on Diego Asencio's impression of his former
captors and their view of Colombian society:
"He (Asencio) thought the terrorists were extremely fuzzy-
minded, One of the members was babbling about children
being beaten up and homeless and starving and old people
without jobs and the CIA running the country. Well in the
first place, that's just not a picture of Colombia, let
alone other country in this he~isphere, as you know.
Asencio replied, -r If my friends were running this country,
as you allege, I can assure you they would have been here
before now to rescue me.'"
In short, Colombian government and society, to the extent it
was dealt with at all by the networks, was portrayed as a working
electoral democracy. In the one spot mentioning guerrilla views
of poverty, unemployment and outside political interference, they
were blithly rebutted. The contrast between network and Times
coverage is quite stark. -----
M19--The nature of the group that seized the Dominican Embassy
received quite different coverage in the two media. The first dif-
ference is in what the group was called. We believe that there is
a significant difference between calling a group "terrorist" (which
has strong negative connotations and ignores the political nature
of a group's acts) and referring to it as "leftist," "guerrilla,"
"militant," or "rebel" (which assumes that it has an overtly politi-
cal motive for its actions). Table 15 (see the attached},compares
the ways in which the three networks a~d the Times (in its head-
lines) referred to the group that seized the embassy. Significant
differences emerge between media and between networks. As the
figures indicate, both NBC and ABC referred to the group as "ter-
~Q~istsn a significant amount of the time. In contrast, CBS was
scrupulous in referring to the group as "leftistl?," "guerrillas,"
114
or "militants," its sale use of the term "terrorist" came on the first
day of the crisis and was not repeated. Interestingly, the networks
seldom referred to the group by its name of M19. Indeed, ABC used
the term seven times in a brief report on the group (discussed below)
in the second day of the seizre and then only once thereafter. NBC
used the group's name only twice, both times in narrative accompany-
ing pictures of the group's flag flying over the embassy with the
title "H19" clearly displayed.
In headlines, the Times coverage differed significantly from
the network's. They consistently referred to the group as "guerril-
las" and five times called them "rebels"--a term that clearly con-
ceded the group's political status. In general, the Times portrayed
the '3"roup as one of many guerrilla groups operating W~ thin Colombia.
They reported that the group had its origins in the socialist wing
of the Nationalist Party of General Gustavo Rojas pinilla, who had
ruled as a "virtual dictator" from 1953-1957. The newspaper sug-
gested that the ideology of the group was quite "heterodox" and dif-
ficult to classify. However, the group was clearly distinct from
other Moscow and Cuban influenced guerrillas operating in the country.
In t~o feature stories, the Times discussed the group's past activ-
ities and noted that: "The group is known for its theatrical, free-
wheeling style, directed as much towards gaining attention as toward
terrar, but it is also known for the military precision of its oper-
ations" (New York Times, March 10, 1980). Most importantly, the
Times also reported on several occasions that the embassy seizure
had apparently been precipitated by the death of a member of the
group while undergoing interrogation by military authorities. His
funeral took place the day before the embassy was seized.
Network coverage of the Ml9 group differed considerably from
Time~ coverage. CBS and NBC scarcely discussed the group at all, as
lndicated by column five in Table 14. Indeed, the only reference
that CBS made to the possible mot~vations or ideology of the group
was to report, on March 8, that the Colombian government believed
that the group were common criminals and not leftist ideologues.
The report was based upon a government claim that the group had
stopped demanding the release of political prisoners and only really
wanted money and safe-passage. No other network or the Times made
a similar report.
ABC devoted considerably more time to the group and its ideol-
ogy. In fact, ABC was the only network to even mention the death of
an MI9 member in government hands as the possible cause of the em-
bassy seizure. On February 28, they aired a short feature on the
group that relied heavily on U.S. State Department sources who
called the group "Maoist, Castroite, Trotskyite." ABC went on to
note that B19 ". . is most effectively described by its activi-
ties: Armed robbery, bomb attacks, assassination and kidnapping."
As in the case of Colombian government and society, viewers relying
on the networks, as opposed to the Times, would have come away with
very different views of M19. The Trmes-reader would have viewed the
group as one with an eclectic ideology, prone to theatrical activ-
ities designed to attract publicity (e.g., on several occasions it
was reported that the group's most well-known operation had been the
theft of Simon Bolivar's sword from a Bogota museum) and only a
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limited penchant for violent terrorist acts (especially when compared
with the other guerrilla groups operating in the country). Against
the background of its coverage of Colombian government and politics
and prominent mention of the death of one of their members, the ac-
tions of M19, while perhaps not admirable, would have at least been
understandable. In contrast, viewers of NBCls coverage would have
had a hard time understanding what the group was, or what its motives
were. viewers of CBS might conclude they were simply a group of crim-
inals attemp~ing to extort money from the government. Viewers of ABC
might have concluded that the group was a hard-line Communist guerril-
la group controlled either by Peking or Havana and prone to gangster-
ish activities.
Demands, negotiations and resolution of the crisis--As might be
expected on the basis of our discussion to this point, the two media
differed considerably in their coverage of the demands made by M19,
the course of the negotiations and the final resolution of the hos-
tage crisis. In the Times, it was consistently reported that the
guerrillas holding the-emnassy were making four demands: Freedom for
300 political prisoners; a ransom of $50 million; safe passage out
of the country; publication of a guerrilla manifesto documenting
abuses by the Colombian government. During the negotiations, it was
reported that the diplomatic corps in Bogota expressed much criticism
of the Colombia government's refusal to bargain in good faith with
the guerrillas (New York Times, March 16, 1980). On March 10, the
Times reported that one reason for the government's intransigence was
the widespread belief that many of the prisoners named by M19 had al-
ready been killed while in military prisons (New York Times, March
10, 1980). On March 18, an article reported that in retaliation for
the escape of one of the hostages, the guerrillas had cut off phone
lines to the outside and, in general, were making life tougher for
the captives (New York Times, March 16, 1980). This story was cor-
rected on the 20th, when ~t was reported that the hostages themselves
had sent a message to the press protesting the Colombian government's
actions. Further, the hostages expressed admiration for the way the
guerrillas had calmly dealt with the escape of the Uruguayan ambas-
sador and IIthey were consequently upset the next day when the Colom-
bian Government asserted that the terrorists had shot at him three
times" (New York Times, March 20, 1980). It turned out that the
government had cut the phone lines, apparently to prevent the com-
pletion of a newspaper interview with the leader of the guerrillas
in the embassy. During this interview, the guerrillas claimed that
it was the government rather than M19 that had stalled the nego-
tiations.
During the course of the negotiations, the Times reported on
concessions made by both sides. On the guerrilla slde, all hostages
except the ambassadors were released; demands for ransom and the
number of political prisoners to be freed were both scaled down. At
the urging of the diplomatic community, the Colombian government
agreed to speed up trials of accused guerrillas and the military re-
leased several people who had been accused of being MIg sympathizers.
~ccording to the Times, the breakthrough that finally led to the
resolution of the crisis was the intervention of the Inter-American
Human Rights Commission and their willingness- to oversee the trialS
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of political prisoners in Colombia. It was estimated that the guer-
rillas were also given between $6 and $12 million upon their depar-
ture for Havana.
Once again, network coverage of the demands, negotiations and
resolution of the crisis differed considerably from the Times' cover-
age. Of the three networks, only ABC mentioned that one of the guer-
rillas! demands was the publication of a manifesto documenting abuses
by the government. When referring to the demand for prisoners' re-
leal:;e, NBC called those named the "friends" of the guerrillas. In
fact:, this network only once referred to the prisoners as "political
pril:,oners" using instead the terms "friends,!' It colleagues, tl "prison-
ers," or "so-called political prisoners."
While much of their coverage was devoted to the negotiations,
network coverage focused on the arrangements and planning of the
meet.ings: For example, showing pictures of a van being parked for a
meet,ing and then clips of the guerrilla and government representa-
tive,s going to and from the van. Little time was devoted to the con-
cessions made by either side and no time was devoted to the inter-
cessions of outside groups (i.e., the diplomatic corps or the Inter-
AmeI'ican Human Rights Commission). NBC was the only network to
charge that the guerrillas had cut the phone lines in retaliation
for the uruguayan ambassador's escape, however, neither they nor any
other network reported that, in fact, it was the government that had
cut off communication. No network mentioned the complaints issued
by the hostages about the government's actions. While all three
networks reported on the reduction in the demands of the guerrillas,
no mention was ever made of the concessions made by the government
(i.e., release of several detained by the military, offers to speed
up trials, agreement to have human rights groups oversee trials).
Given the lack of substantive coverage of the negotiations, the
resolution of the crisis was largely unexplained on the network news.
No mention was made on NBC or CBS of the actual deal that was struck.
Only ABC mentioned that, while the guerrilla demand for the release
of political prisoners was not met, the government had made "other
concessions." These other concessions were not specified.
Once again, the conclusions that one would draw from these two
SOUI'ces of news are quite different. Following the Times coverage,
one would conclude that the negotiations had been marked by compro-
mise, on both sides and that the colombian Government had been pres-
sured by the diplomatic community, outside human rights groups and
the hostages themselves. It was clear that the resolution was the
result of a compromise struck between the two sides.
Network coverage, on the other hand, would have 'led one to dif-
ferent conclusions. Firstly, the political demands of the guerril-
las were never made clear. Secondly, it was never made clear that
other groups were involved in the negotiations in addition to the
guex-rillas and the government. Finally, no coverage was given to
concessions made by the Colombian government. Thus, one could not
be sure why the crisis ended at all when it did. In the networks'
coverage, it seemed almost as if the guerrillas had simply grown
tired of the seige and had agreed to depart for Cuba with none of
their demands met but their own skins intact.
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One of the obvious differences between the broadcast and print
media is the amount of space that is available for covering the news.
While the New York Times has over thirty pages daily devoted just to
national and internat10nal news, the networks are limited to approxi-
mately 23 minutes of total air time. Thus, one cannot expect the
networks to provide the same sort of detailed information as the
Times. In order to understand the degree to which the lapses in net-
work coverage we have discussed are due to time limitations rather
than to editorial decisions, we now examine the time and space de-
voted to coverage of the one American hostage, Ambassador Diego
Asencio.
The New York Times, while mentioning Ambassador Asencio as one
of the hostages, ran only one feature exclusively on the American
(New York Times, April 6, 1980). Moreover, they also ran a feature
on the hostage Mexican Ambassador (New York Times, March 21, 1980):
We had apparently emerged as the leader of the hostage group and was
the only hostage to participate in the actual negotiations between
guerrillas and the government. Thus, the Times clearly viewed the
American Ambassador as peripheral to the main story which was Colom-
bia, the guerrillas, their demands and the negotiations.
As column seven in Table 14 makes clear, the networks did not
treat the American Ambassador as the peripheral aspect. Both NBC
and CBS devoted more time to the Ambassador than they did to Colom-
bian government and society, Ml9, and guerrilla demands combined.
ABC devoted less time to Asencio, but still this amounted to more
than any other individual topic we have discussed. It should be
noted that the figures in column seven do not represent simple men-
tions of the Ambassador, but rather reflect features devoted to him
(e.g., interviews with his colleagues and family, pictures of him
returning home, pictures taken of him while inside the embassy) .
Because of the significant amount of broadcast time devoted to a
substantively insignificant actor, we conclude that the networks
chose to downplay the other aspects of the story discussed above;
coverage was limited by editorial decisions about what was either
important or interesting about the story, rather than by time
pressures.
In our analysis of overall trends in network coverage of ter-
rorism, we found that this coverage was an inaccurate reflection of
trends in actual events. However, the inaccuracies seemed to vary
quite randomly. In our case study, we find a much more systematic
pattern to the inaccuracies presented by the network news. These
inaccuracies are well-captured by the biases in coverage resulting
from journalists! acceptance of what Gans (1979: Chapter 2) calls
"enduring values" as well as from a manner in which the networks
gather their reports. Significantly, these biases are not evident
in the Times coverage of the event we studied.
Three on Gan's enduring values are partiCUlarly important in
explaining the coverage of the Colombian hostage crisis: AltruistiC
democracy, ethnocentrism, and an abiding faith in social order.
Gans notes that the journalists he studied ha~ a deep faith in de-
mocracy as it functioned in the United States •. Although theY,were
critical of certain aspects of the political system, they be11eved
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it was the best system possible. Further ethnocentrism led these
journalists to view even foreign news from a distinctly American per-
spective. That is,' they tend to interpret events as if they were
occurring against an American backdrop. Finally, a belief in the
sanctity of the existing social order leads journalists to be deeply
suspicious of anyone who attempts to change that order while operation
outside of existing institutions.
Together, these three values explain a good deal about the way
the networks covered the hostage crisis. First, the presence of a
constitution and elections--the trappings of democracy--Ied the net-
works to assume that Colombia was a functioning democracy: Elections
and a constitution were assumed to mean the same thing in Colombia as
they did in the U.S. Second, the apparent presence of democratic in-
stitutions made MIg's actions illegitimate: If the group had griev-
ances, why weren't these grievances voiced through the electoral
system? Third, the bias towards social order, coupled with the
trappings of democracy, made violent challenges to the system even
more illegitimate and incomprehensible. Given this worldview, it was
unlikely that the networks would report ex-tensively on M19' s griev-
ances or grant any sort of legitimacy to its members' actions. Fur-
ther, ignoring these issues made for a much more seamless and unam-
biguous story. There could be "good guys" (the hostages, in particu-
lar Asencio and the government) and "bad guys" (the masked guerril-
las). Because they clashed with the values of the journalists or the
producers, issues like military control of the government, the tor-
ture and killing of political prisoners, and the marginal nature of
Colombian democracy were best ignored.
One other difference between the networks and the Times is worth
noting: The sources used by journalists. Gans notes that the jour-
nalists he studied had a pronounced tendency to rely almost solely
on official sources. This tendency is in evidence in the network
coverage we examined. The only two sources ever mentioned were the
U.S. State Department and the Colombian Government; given the con-
tent of the broadcasts, it is unlikely that any other sources were
ever consulted. In contrast, the Times reporting drew upon a wide
rangl~ of sources: various human rights groups, leftist newspapers,
anonymous sources within the Colombian government, academics spe-
cializing in Colombia. Given the worldvie'" of the network journal-
ists and producers and the "neat" way the story could be packaged
within this worldview however, these sources were largely unneces-
sary: It was clear that MIg was a socially and politically marginal
group of near-gangsters, and it was unnecessary to probe further.
VII. Summary and discussion
As television becomes an increasingly important source of
poli-tical information for the U.S. public, two questions are in-
creasingly relevant to political scientists: "'i'lhat are the effects
of TV on the attitudes and behaviors of individuals?". And, "What
is the content of television-based information?" Regarding the first
question, findings that learning often takes place passively and
that attitudes, agendas and behaviors are shaped by that learning
incrl:=:ases the importance of finding answers to the second question.
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In this paper we have tried to present a partial answer to the
question by focusing on an important and heavily covered issue: In-
ternational terror1sm. By using a comprehensive data base of inter-
national terrorist events from 1969 to 1980 and comparing it to a
content analysis of network news, we were able to see how accurately
the images of international terrorism were presented. Our analysis
suggests several things. First and most consistently, the- networks
presented almost identical views of international terrorism. The
pressures for conformity appear to be formidable. Second, the single
view which emerges is quite inaccurate. The overall amount of cover-
age varied in almost random fashion, showing no relationship to the
amount of terrorism occurring year in and year out. Years with rela-
tively little terrorism received relatively large amounts of cover-
age, and years of great un~est often went practically unnoticed.
Certain areas, like the Middle East, received undue attention year
after year, while Latin America was systematically downplayed. West-
ern Europe, North America, Africa and Asia were periodically ignored
or put center stage. Similar inconsistencies were found in examin-
ing types of terrorism. Even when focusing solely on terrorism
affecting U.S. citizens, the network coverage bore little relation-
ship to actual events.
Our case study seems to bear out the findings of the events data
analysis. The worldview of broadcast journalists makes it difficult
for them to develop stories that illuminate terrorist events by
analyzing political and social systems that are very different from
American ones. Viewing other societies as if they were the United
States makes it impossible to understand, justify, or even report
on groups that mount violent challenges to an existing political
order. Hence, terrorist groups are portrayed as, at best, inscrut-
able and, at worst, lunatics or cornmon (i.e., apolitical) criminals.
The bottom line is this: If people in the United States depend on
the netowrks for information about international terrorism, and if
they learn by exposure, then Americans have a sense of international
terrorism that is seriously misguided.
Any discussion of the causes of the patterns uncovered or of
their implications would be highly speculative, but certain things
became apparent in the course of doing this analysis. Television
is an event-centered medium. It is at its best when visually pre-
senting the drama of world events. As a medium severely limited by
time, however, most of what occurs in the world is simply never men-
tioned. Where television succeeds or fails as a mirror of reality,
therefore, is in the mix of events it covers. If it cannot cover
all the terrorism which occurs, it must cover specific events with
an eye to achieving an overall picture which is consistent with
~orld events both within years and across them. But there is no
1ncentive in this type of self-monitoring. Sponsors look at rat-
ings, not quality, and ratings are based on audience share, not
accurate images. The end result is coverage which is erratic, over-
simplified, morally unambiguous and misleading.
The implications of this kind of information source must be
considered both specifically in terms of international terrorism and,
more generally, in terms of political education. International ter-
rorism is a response to domestic and international political, social,
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ecor:.omic, and cultural conditions. When one examines the events data
or our case study, it is clear that there is a method to the madness.
Terr'orism's location, frequency, targets and reasons are not myster-
ies, nor are they random events which occur sporadically in unpre-
dictable parts of the world. And yet this irrational view of terror-
ism is precisely the one which dominates the airwaves. One need not
agree with terrorism as a political tool to see that it is a useful
barometer of a political system's health. The events data present
an image of a patient who is slowly but steadily being affected by
a disease, the symptom of which is international terrorism. The
network news coverage shows a patient which is, at different times,
healthy, a hypochondriac, suffering from mysterious ailments, and/or
the victim of a sudden, unexpected heart attack.
It is difficult to know how the public reacts to this kind of
coverage. It is easy to imagine outrage, fear, anger, confusion,
and even a sense of security at different points in time resulting
from watching network news coverage of terrorism. What is hard to
imagine resulting is an accurate understanding of where, why, how,
and against whom terrorism occurs.
While we cannot say that the patterns of misinformation seen in
network coverage of international terrorism exist for other kinds of
political phenomena, the analysis presented here suggests that there
is reason for concern. The information explosion begun with the
development of mass-circulation newspapers and extending into the
future with the expansion of cable has been viewed as a potential
boon to democratic politics. The key is often seen as developing a
population which cares enough about the political world to use newly-
available information to shape its attitudes and behaviors. If net-
work coverage of international terrorism is any indication, such a
system may have more shortcomings than one with a less attentive
public.
* * * * * * *
* Prepared for delivery at the 1982 Annual Meeting of The American
political Science Association, The Denver Hilton Hotel, September
2-5, 1982. Copyright by the AMerican Political Science Associa-
tion. With the permissions of the authors.
Footnotes-----
1. It is important to note that our usage of the term "terror-
ism" is a qualified one. The term has a pronounced negative conno-
tation--a meaning we wish to avoid--that tends to downplay the poli-
tical motivations and lack of other options available to many of
those who plan and carry out such acts. We wish that a more neutral
tern was available, but general usage of the word terrorism--by
scholars, the media and the general public--makes it the most eco-
nomical means for referring to the phenomenon we are studying. See
page 3 for a more careful definiti~n of our use of the term.
2. The ITERATE data is available through the Inter-University
Consortium for Political and Social Research for only the years
1968-1977. A recent government report uses the ITERATE data to sho~·'
patterns of international terrorism from 1968 to 1980 however
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(Patterns of International Terrorism). E:ince the data provided in
th~s report ~s broken down ~nto the general categories we intended to
examine (location, type of act, etc.), and since it was based on an
expanded set of sources designed to count:eract aU. S. bias, we opted
for the longer time span and, therefore, use the ITERATE data as pre-
sented in this report as our source. It is important to note that
the data is still the ITERATE data and the government report is not
a position paper. The views presented in the report are those o-f-
the author, David Milbank, and not of the National Foreign Assess-
ment Center, ·which pUblishes it.
3. It should be noted that the seizure of the Dominican embassy
took place in the midst of the Iranian seizure of the American em-
bassy in Tehran. The long-running Iranian situation no doubt affect-
ed, to some extent, the type of coverage that the Colombian seizure
received. For two reasons, however, we believe in the generalizabil-
ity of our analysis and conclusions. Fil=st, the results of our anal-
ysis conform quite closely to much that has already been written
about network news coverage. We believe that our general findings
would hold no matter when the Colombian seizure had taken place.
Second, the degree to which the Iranian embassy seizure affected
coverage of the Colombian event is an in~~eresting question in and of
itself. Notwithstanding the fact that both situations involved the
seizure of an embassy, the countries, the groups that seized the em-
bassies, the targets of the seizure and the motivations of those in-
volved could hardly have been more different. Treating the inci-
dents as if they were in some sense similar or related would indi-
cate a serious bias in coverage of the events.
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YEAR NUMBER OF AMOUNT OF COVERAGE (Minutes)
EVENTS ABC CBS NBC---
1969 214 211 205 217
1970 391 216 233 242
1971 324 74 81 66
1972 648 213 195 218
1973 564 118 143 128
1974 528 142 124 124
1975 475 215 210 220
1976 599 142 169 106
1977 562 220 219 183
1978 850 153 130 145
1979 657 672 640 535
1980 760 1040 988 730
TABLE 1: Patterns of Occurrence and Presentation of the
Overall Amount of International Terrorism
* * * * * * * * * * *
YEAR RATIO: HINUTES COVERAGE!* OF EVENTS
ABC NBC CBS
1969 .99 .96 1. 01
1970 .55 .60 .62
1971 .23 .25 .20
1972 .33 .30 .34
1973 .21 .25 .23
1974 .27 .23 .23
1975 .45 .44 .46
1976 .24 .28 .18
1977 .39 .39 .33
1978 .18 .15 .17
1979 1. 02 .97 .81
1980 1. 37 1. 30 .96
AVERAGE .52 .51 .46
TABLE 2, Ratio of Minutes of Coverage Over Number
of Events
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YEAR
69 70 71 72 ~ 74 75 76 77 78 79 80
NORTH
AMERICA
ABC 24 49 10 21 7 1 -6 18 17 -6 -8 -10
CBS 34 46 7 23 10 5 -6 8 17 -7 -8 -10
NBC 37 57 12 17 8 -2 -9 28 17 -3 -9 -6
LATIN
AMERICA
ABC -27 -28 -21 -14 -6 -20 -15 -22 -9 -6 -12 -20
CBS -30 -36 -23 -12 -9 -16 -14 -20 -8 -8 -13 -19
NBC -31 -33 -12 -11 -9 -13 -12 -15 -12 -7 -12 -15
WESTERN
EUROPE
~ -5 25 17 15 0 -9 -9 -23 10 4 -23 -24
CBS -10 32 24 21 4 -15 -6 -21 -4 -9 -23 -25
NBC -17 30 11 18 6 -17 -2 -18 9 -14 -22 -25
USSR/EAST
EUROPE
~ 0 3 0 1 -1 0 -1 3 0 1 -1 -1
CBS 1 6 -1 0 ·-1 0 -1 2 0 0 0 -1
NBC 0 4 3 1 -1 0 -1 0 -1 0 -1 -1
AFRICA
~ -3 -3 -2 -1 0 -3 -3 19 -2 -3 -4 -4
CBS -3 -4 -2 -1 -2 -3 -2 13 -2 0 -3 -4
NBC -3 -4 -2 -1 -2 -3 -2 14 -3 -2 -4 -4
MIDDLE EAST
ABC 3 44 10 7 20 44 0 14 15 25 59 52
CBS -5 41 11 8 13 41 6 13 13 35 54 66
NBC -2 47 7 10 17 45 -2 21 7 30 57 59
ASIA
--ABC 18 -1 -7 -20 -·5 -4 35 7 -1 -4 -9 -6
CBS 24 0 -9 -20 -5 -1 25 0 1 -4 -9 -6
NBC 30 -2 -3 -20 -5 -2 33 0 -1 -4 -8 -6
PACIFIC
ABC -3 0 -1 0 0 0 -1 5 -1 -2 0 0
CBS -3 1 -1 0 0 0 0 2 -1 -2 0 0
NBC -3 -1 -1 0 0 0 -1 1 -2 0 0 0-
TABLE 3, Percentage Under or Over Coverage of Where International
Terror~srn Occurs (W~thUl Each Year)
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YEAR
69 70 71 72 rr;- 74 75 76 77 78 79 80
BOMBINGS
--ABC -45 -36 -32 -6 -27 -37 ·-41 -32 -43 -32 -38 -35
CBS -54 -40 -29 -15 -24 -42 ·-41 -32 -38 -35 -36 -35
NBC -58 -39 -27 -9 -20 -46 ·-41 -25 -50 -38 -35 -35
KIDNAPINGS
ABC 2 15 9 18 0 -3 4 -5 11 2 -5 -2
CBS 1 4 8 22 -2 -1 6 -3 5 0 -5 -2
NBC 1 13 16 25 -4 4 4 -4 8 -1 -5 -2
HQS'rAGES
--1~ 0 -2 0 20 22 21 18 -1 32 7 76 88
CBS 0 -2 0 29 22 22 16 2 31 5 70 89
HBC 0 -2 1 29 14 32 17 2 42 10 74 83
HIJACKINGS
ABC 29 48 15 26 21 1 36 39 43 11 -3 -3
CBS 31 61 7 29 24 3 30 27 38 17 -2 -4
NBC 39 57 14 26 29 6 33 24 40 7 -3 -3
ASSASSINATION
ABC 23 10 -1 -1 12 5 0 12 17 2 -2 -11
CBS 35 3 7 -1 5 10 0 15 13 -2 -1 -12
NBC 33 8 18 -2 16 10 3 19 18 2 -1 -10
THREAT
--ABC -5 -16 -16 -7 -14 -6 -7 -12 -11 -24 -15 -15
CBS -6 -15 -12 -5 -15 4 -7 -14 -10 -28 -14 -14
NBC -6 -15 -16 -6 -19 -1 -7 -13 -11 -26 -15 -14
ARMED ATTACKS
ABC 1 4 I 32 21 24 2 1 1 43 3 -6
CBS -2 1 0 29 25 17 3 4 0 54 5 -5
NBC -3 2 6 31 20 24 2 8 -4 40 4 -6
TABLE 4 : Percenta e Under or Over Covera e of Ty es of International----
Terror~sm W1th1n Each Year
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YEAR
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
earpini 6, Williams
Percent Over or Under Coverage
ABC CBS NBC
9 23 30
-12 -10 0
-54 -52 -44
-18 -14 -15
3 -1 -4
-19 -15 -11
28 27 18
30 7 28
0 -1 -7
-37 -40 -35
49 41 42
57 46 52
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TABLE 5: Percentage Under or Over Coverage of Internat~onal
Terrorism Against U.S. Terrorism
* * * * * * * * * * *
YEAR NUMBER OF AMOUNT OF COVERAGE (Minutes)
EVENTS ~ CBS NBC---
1969 124 142 165 191
1970 262 118 133 162
1971 243 15 19 20
1972 248 44 46 50
1973 225 50 56 46
1974 197 25 27 32
1975 179 142 137 123
1976 227 97 76 70
1977 193 75 72 49
1978 386 8 6 15
1979 241 578 503 424
1980 271 962 934 644
TABLE 6: Patterns of Occurrence and Presentation of the
Amount of International Terrorism Aga1nst u.s.
Citizens and Property
YEAR RATIO: MINUTES COVERAGE/# OF EVENTS
ABC NBC CBS
1969 1.15 1.33 1.54
1970 .45 .51 .62
1971 .06 .08 .08
1972 .18 .19 .20
1973 .22 .25 .20
1974 .13 .14 .16
1975 .79 .77 .69
1976 .43 .33 .31
1977 .39 .37 .25
1978 .02 .02 .04
1979 2.40 2.09 1. 76
1980 3.55 3.45 2.38
AVERAGE .81 .79 .69
TABLE 7, Ratio of Minutes of Coverage Over Number
of Events Involving U.S. Targets
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YEAR
69 70 71 72 ~ 74 75 76 77 78 79 80
BOMBINGS
ABC -71 -45 -43 -35 -40 -62 -45 -37 -49 -38 -48 -34
CBS -70 -48 -55 -30 -43 -63 -44 -40 -59 -44 -47 -34
NBC -73 -48 -58 -22 -42 -73 -47 -38 -59 -44 -47 -34
KIDNAPINGS
ABC 5 2 39 -2 1 20 1 -1 -4 -2 -3 -4
CBS 2 -3 36 -2 1 14 2 -1 -4 -2 -3 -4
NBC 3 -1 35 -2 -2 28 -1 -1 -4 -2 -2 -4
HOSTAGES
ABC 0 -2 0 0 30 29 12 -1 39 0 87 95
CBS 0 -2 0 0 29 18 9 -1 54 0 86 93
NBC 0 -2 0 0 33 19 15 -1 66 0 91 92
HIJACKINGS
ABC 42 76 31 86 14 6 <17 47 22 15 -5 -5
CBS 36 84 30 81 26 3 32 47 20 38 -5 -6
NBC 44 71 35 74 20 9 :;0 33 12 14 -5 -4
ASSASSINATION
ABC 39 -2 1 -2 0 41 3 15 -3 -2 0 -7
CBS 47 -2 0 -2 -12 33 2 19 -3 24 -1 -7
NBC 42 1 8 -2 8 43 1 29 7 -2 0 -7
THREAT
ABC -10 -19 -21 -28 -23 -9 -10 -23 -11 -41 -18 -18
CBS -10 -19 -6 -27 -·32 -7 -10 -23 -8 -41 -18 -17
NBC -10 -19 -21 -28 -30 -9 -10 -22 -11 -41 -18 -17
ARMED ATTACK
ABC -3 1 0 -4 6 -3 -4 2 11 18 1 -4
CBS -3 -1 -2 -4 21 -3 -4 0 8 35 1 -3
NBC -1 1 -2 -4 25 -3 -4 3 -3 -3 0 -3
TABLE 8· Percentage Under or Over Coverage of Types of International
Terrorism Against U.S. Targets (Within Each Year)
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YEAR
69 70 71 72 ~ 74 75 76 77 78 79 80
GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS
--A~ -4 -49 -29 -49 -6 62 0 7 -12 -13 50 44
CBS 3 -53 -29 -48 0 40 -4 4 -20 -22 48 44
NBC -2 -45 -17 -28 7 67 0 17 -21 -22 52 42
MILITARY
--A~ 30 -11 24 -6 -5 -11 44 -15 -30 -12 -13 -11
CBS 28 -11 23 -3 -13 6 37 -24 -25 -12 -11 -11
NBC 33 -15 9 7 -13 -11 42 -19 -29 -12 -12 -11
BUSINESS
--A~ -30 -13 -16 -19 -23 -46 -37 -31 -7 37 -28 -24
CBS -27 -15 -6 -16 -28 -46 -28 -35 -23 5 -27 -24
NBC -29 -15 2 -18 -31 -54 -39 -35 -31 5 -27 -24
PRIVATE
CITIZENS
--A~ 5 71 29 78 24 -11 3 44 65 41 -8 -8
CBS -4 76 13 77 37 4 13 57 75 18 -9 -8
NBC -1 69 43 69 28 -2 3 37 81 48 -9 -7
TABLE 9: Percentage Over or Under Coverage of Types of Victims of---- International Terror1sm Against U.S. Targets
(Within Each Year)
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PLACE NETWORK
ABC CBS NBC
NORTH AMERICA 2 3 6
LATIN AMERICA -17 -17 -15
WESTERN EUROPE -13 -13 -11
USSR/EAST EUROPE 0 0 0
AFRICA -1 -1 -2---
MIDDLE EAST 38 40 36
ASIA -2 -2 0
PACIFIC -1 -1 -1
TABLE 10: Percentage Under or Over Coverage of Where
Internat10nal Terror1sm Occurs: 1969-1980
* * * * * * * * * * *
NETWORK
ABC CBS NBC
KIDNAPING 1 0 2
HOSTAGES 48 47 43
BOMBINGS -38 -38 -38
ARMED ATTACKS 5 6 4
HIJACKS 14 14 17
ASSASSINATIONS 2 2 5
THREATS -14 -13 -15
TABLE 11: Percentage Under and Over Coverage of Type of
International Terrorist At:tack: 1969-1980
ACT NETWORK
ABC CBS NBC
KIDNAPING -3 -2 -5
HOSTAGES 67 68 -59
BOMBINGS -49 -49 -49
ARMED ATTACKS 0 0 -1
HIJACKINGS 14 15 18
ASSASSINATIONS 3 4 7
THREATS -22 -21 -22
TABLE 12: Percentage Under and Over Coverage of Types of
International Terrorist Acts Against U.S.
Targets: 1969 1980
* * * * * * * * * * *
TYPE OF NETWORK
VICTIM
ABC CBS NBC
GOVERNMENT 35 30 29
MILITARY -7 -7 -5
BUSINESS -30 -30 -30
PRIVATE CITIZENS 3 6 6
TABLE 13: Percentage Under and Over Coverage of Types of
u.s. Victims ~f International Terrorist
Attacks: 1969-1980
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,... 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
w SOURCE NUMBER OF BROADCASTS/ TOTAL TIME TIME DEVOTED TUm TIME TIHEA --- DEVOTED DEVOTED DEVOTEDBROADCASTS STORIES IN OF TO COLOMBIAN
STORIES FIRST MINUTE/ BROADCASTS GOVERNMENT & TO MIg TO DEMANDS TO u.s.
ON FIRST PAGE SOCIETY OF MIg AMBASSADOR
ABC 20 4 17:30 : 24 1:32 1:38 1: 48
CBS 20 4 21:40 :15 :15 1:18 4:22
NBC 21 1 24:00 : 4 2 :42 1:24 3:04
N.Y. Times 52 9
TABLE 14: Summary of Amount and Cor.Sent of Med1a Coverage of Embassy Se1zure
* * * * * * * * * * *
SOURCE M19 TERRORISTS LEFTISTS MILITANTS GUERRILLAS GUNMEN REBELS---
ABC 8' 17 10 1 21 0 0
CBS 5 1 20 21 29 4 0
~
NBC 2 31 6 0 46 0 0 g:
New York m
Times 0 1 0 0 17 0 5 f"
(headlines) ,...,...
".
TABLE 15: Frequency of Terms Used to Describe Embassy Captors ~
* Seven of these uses came in one segment broadcast February 28, 1980.
